This paper estimates the effects of financialization on physical investment in the UK using panel data based on balance-sheets of publicly listed non-financial companies supplied by Worldscope for the period 1985-2013. We find robust evidence of an adverse effect of not only financial payments (interests and dividends) but also financial incomes on the rate of accumulation. The negative impacts of financial incomes from interests and dividends are particularly strong for the pre-crisis period.
Introduction
This paper estimates the effects of financialization on physical investment in the UK using panel data based on balance-sheets of non-financial publicly listed companies for the period of . We aim at contributing to the understanding of the impact of two institutional changes, which emerged in the last decades in developed capitalist economies: a) a new regime of accumulation largely shaped around financial motives and b) the consolidation of the 'shareholder value' as the key principle in corporate governance 1 . The USA and the UK have been at the forefront of these changes (Lapavitsas and Powell, 2013) 2 . This paper aims at presenting a theoretical model and an empirical analysis of the effects of financialization on firms' investment in fixed assets in the case of the UK.
Back in the 1950s Joan Robinson (1952:86) stated that "where enterprise leads finance follows", describing a financial system that was merely supporting trajectories already planned by the productive sector. In contrast, recent structural changes in the functioning of capitalism mark the growing prominence of the 'financial motives' over the traditional productive purposes. In this sense, the picture for the UK economy, along with other developed capitalist economies, is emblematic. In the 1970s, the share of manufacturing in value added was equal to 31% whilst the financial activities (Financial Intermediation and Real Estate -FIRE) counted for only 13%, as shown in Figure 1 . Since 1991 the share of FIRE has surpassed manufacturing, and as of 2013 the financial sector represents 31.2% of the total value added, whilst that of manufacturing dropped to 9.8%. Instead of being merely a vehicle for more efficient production plans, in the last decades the financial activities have grown disproportionately compared to the financing requirements of the rest of the economy.
This new configuration raises the question of how this imbalance affected the accumulation processes in the non-financial sector.
[Figure 1]
This tendency could be interpreted as the result of the growth of the UK (and especially London) as an international financial centre specialized in providing unique financial services to the global economic system. In this view, this potentially positive structural change would have benefited all the other economic setors. In fact, the mainstream literature asserts that financial markets facilitate the financing and the efficient allocation of investment (King and Levine, 1993; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Beck et al., 2000; Love, 2003; Beck and Levine, 2004; Levine, 2005) . However, Arestis and Demetriades (1997) warn against the robustness of these results based on cross-country evidence, which do not take into account the institutional peculiarities.
Moreover, the effect of stock market development on growth is found to be weaker than that of the banking sector (Arestis et al., 2001) . Recently after the [2007] [2008] crash, the disproportionate growth of the financial system has been questioned in some mainstream contributions as well (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Beck et al., 2014) .
In particular, Law and Singh (2014) argue that there is a 'threshold effect' in the relationship between the extension of financial resources and growth; thus the expansion of the financial system is beneficial to growth only up to a point. Recently, a similar argument has been put forward by an IMF discussion note with respect to emerging markets (Sahay et al., 2015) , which argues that 'too much finance' increases both economic and financial volatility.
The Post-Keynesian literature on 'financialization' illustrates the negative impacts of expanding financial sector on the economic systems (Epstein, 2005) , on income distribution and demand (Onaran et al., 2010; Hein, 2013) , and in particular on investment (Stockhammer, 2004 (Stockhammer, , 2006 Orhagnazi, 2008a; Dallery, 2009; Cordonnier and Van de Velde, 2015) . 'Financialization' is a self-reinforcing socio-economic process, which manifests itself in the growing prominence of behaviours derived from the functioning of the financial sector. A similar argument can be found in the marxist literature, for which the long-term trajectories of the economies gravitate more around the financial sector and less around the productive one (Foster, 2010) . Since the 1980s, the slow down in investment and growth went along with a rise in the interest and dividend payments and share buybacks of the non-financial corporations (NFCs), which 'punctured' the value generated by NFCs (Duménil and Levy, 2004) . As a consequence, companies experienced a significant reduction in available funds for physical investments. 3 Despite an expanding theoretical literature on the effects of financialization, the empirical evidence is predominantly relegated to a macro perspective, especially in the case of physical investment. The origins of the theoretical microeconomic approach to the impact of finance on investment can be traced back to the seminal works of Fazzari and Mott (1986) and Ndikumana (1999) . To the best of our knowledge only Orhangazi (2008b) and Demir (2009) analyse directly the effects of financialization on accumulation from a microeconomic perspective.
The novelty of this paper is, firstly, to provide a model of firm-level investment, which extends the Post-Keynesian model by Fazzari and Mott (1986) by integrating the effects of financial incomes as well as payments in a coherent fashion. Second, we use the Worldscope database for firm balance sheets, which allows us to build a consistent measure for companies' financial activities regarding both inflows and outflows. Third, we provide the first micro-econometric evidence for the UK on the effects of financialization on investment using firm data, which is an important but underresearched case. Finally, we compare the explanatory power of the Post-Keynesian model to the mainstream Tobin's Q model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the key theoretical and empirical contributions in the literature. Section 3 presents the alternative models of investment to be estimated. Section 4 introduces the data and the stylized facts of our sample. Section 5 discusses the estimation methodology. Section 6 presents the estimation results. Section 7 concludes.
Accumulation of fixed assets, liquidity, and financialization
In the earlier 'accelerator investment models' (e.g. Kuh and Meyer, 1955; Evans, 1967) the capital expenditure was almost entirely explained by expected profitability measured by sales. In contrast, the early neoclassical approach modelled the firm's investment decision as a static maximization problem of discounted flows of profits over an infinite time horizon (Jorgenson, 1963; 1971) . As an alternative, investment models, based on the maximization of the expected cash flows (or market value) in the presence of adjustment costs and expectations, which take the dynamic process explicitly into account, have been proposed (Chirinko, 1993) . Within this group, the socalled 'Q model' of Brainard and Tobin (1968) , which models investment using the Tobin's Q variable, defined as the ratio of the firm's stock market valuation to its capital replacement cost, has been widely used. However, firm-level empirical analysis has failed to provide evidence of a strong explanatory power of the Q variable (Hayashi and Inoue, 1991; Bond et al., 1992) . Possible mainstream explanations focused on the bias of the stock market evaluation due to asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and periodic 'financial bubbles' (Bond and Cummins, 2001; Bond et al., 2004) .
But more importantly, as argued by Hubbard (1998) , the source of financing matter for investment.
Empirical evidence shows that cash-flows, i.e. internal funds, are important determinants of investment (Fazzari et al., 1988; Blundell et al., 1992; Brown et al., 2009 ). In particular, the seminal contribution by Fazzari et al. (1988) shows that fluctuations in internal finance, as reflected by cash-flows, are statistically more important than the stock market evaluation in determining the level of accumulation.
Liquidity constraints play a crucial role in determining investment (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Chirinko and Schaller, 1995; Kadapakkam et al., 1998) In the specific case of the UK, evidence shows that cash flow always has a signficant positive effect on accumulation, whilst the effects of the stock market evaluation and debt are mixed (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Bond et al., 2003; Bloom et al., 2007) .
The mainstream investment literature argues that companies' financing issues mainly derive from agency problems, and the development of financial markets can relax these constraints (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Love, 2003; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; Love and Zicchino, 2006; Guariglia and Carpenter, 2008; Bond et al., 2003) . Companies' financial flows are not directly taken into account in these analyses.
As a result of the transformation of the economies towards a financialized stage in the last decades, the mainstream models of investment may be misspecified due to their neglect of some important factors in the firms' financing and investment decision.
The Post-Keynesian literature offers a more holistic approach to the analysis of the effect of financial markets on investment, where NFCs are far from passive players under the control of oversized financial markets. In addition to (or even partially substituting) physical investments, NFCs can readily accumulate financial assets. The Post-Keynesian literature conceives the firm as a 'battlefield' for different vested interests (Stockhammer, 2006) . The most visible type of internal conflict is reflected in shareholders' preference for short-term profitability, which undermines the accumulation of fixed capital (Dallery, 2009; Hein and van Treeck, 2008) . There is a 'growth-profit trade-off' within the managerial decision-making process of firms (Lavoie, 1992) . The increasing involvement of the NFCs in finance-related activities has to be understood primarily as a consequence of a change in the corporate governance (Lazonick and O'sullivan, 2000) . From the early 1980s onwards, there has been a legitimization of the rule of maximizing the 'shareholder value' (Rappaport, 1999) .
While the former imperative has been to 'retain and re-invest', under the shareholder rule, to 'downsize plants and distribute earnings' is paramount. The management has to please the shareholder's requests by distributing dividends and boosting share prices through share buyback operations (De Ridder, 2009 ). Furthermore, financialization offers a fall back option to firms to invest in reversible short-term financial assets instead of irreversible long-term fixed assets, and thereby financial assets crowd out accumulation. This behavioural twist negatively affected the longterm investment plans.
The vast majority of the empirical literature on the impacts of financialization on investment is based on a macroeconomic framework (Stockhammer, 2004; van Treek, 2008; Orhangazi, 2008a; Arestis et al., 2012) .
Regarding firm level effect of finance on investment, the seminal paper by Fazzari and Mott (1986) models the three key components of the Post-Keynesian theory of investment: a positive effect of sales (as a proxy for capacity utilization), a positive and independent effect of internal finance, i.e. 'less expensive' retained earnings, and a negative impact of interest expenses. 4 In particular, they introduce a flow measure for interest payments to define a 'committed constraint' on the available cash flow.
In another Post-Keynesian microeconomic investment model, Ndikumana (1999) finds negative effects of both stock and flows of debt. Firm's indebtedness not only reduces the cash flow (via interest payments), but also affects the sustainability of investments.
However, Fazzari and Mott (1986) and Ndikumana (1999) do not model the impact of financial revenues, which is an important dimension of financialization. To the best of our knowledge, there are only two microeconomic papers that analyse the effects of financial incomes of NFCs. Orhangazi (2008b) finds a negative effect of financial payments and long-term debt on accumulation in the NFCs in the USA, whereas the effects of financial incomes on investment depend on the firm size and sector, with a significant negative crowding out effect for larger firms, and a positive effect for the smaller firms in the non-durables sector, indicating its dual role as a source of internal finance. Demir (2009) finds that increasing returns on financial assets relative to fixed assets reduced accumulation in the NFCs in Argentina, Mexico, and Turkey.
Building on this literature, in the next section we describe the specifications of different models of investment, by comparing a basic model vis-à-vis a full specification which takes explicitly into account the effects of financialization including both financial incomes and payments.
Alternative models of investment
Within the Post-Keynesian theory capital accumulation is an intrinsically dynamic process (Kalecki, 1954; Lopez and Mott, 1998) . Physical investment is an irreversible phenomenon. There is a path dependency that link past and future levels of accumulation, as confirmed by the previous empirical literature (Ford and Poret, 1991; Kopcke and Brauman, 2001; Orhangazi, 2008b; Arestis et al., 2012) . Therefore, in all the models to be estimated, we include the lagged investment. Also all other explanatory variables are lagged in order to depict the 'adjustment processes'.
To analyse the potential effects of financialization, we start with a basic investment model based on Fazzari and Mott (1986) . Next, by progressively enriching this basic version, we present our final model of 'financialized investment'. Equation
(1) presents the basic model, where the rate of accumulation, I/K, is:
where I is the gross addition to fixed assets, K is the net capital stock, π is operating income, CD are cash dividends, (π-CD) identifies the retained earnings, S is net sales, iD is the interest expenses on debt; all variables are normalized by K in order to control for firm size. 5 i is the firm index. βt identifies a set of time-dummies to control for unobservable time-specific effects common to all firms, whilst the standard disturbance term εit captures firm-specific fixed effects and idiosyncratic shocks. All variables are introduced in first and second lags to reflect the time consideration in the investment plans. The retained earnings/fixed assets ratio is a measure of the profit rate, the sales/fixed assets ratio is a proxy reflecting capacity utilization, whilst interest expenses reflect the firm-level cost of capital. We expect positive effects of the lagged accumulation rate, retained earnings, and sales on investment. In contrast, we expect the impact of interest payments (or 'cash commitments') to be negative.
In this basic model cash dividends are conceived as simply a reduction of available internal funds. However, in developed financialized capitalist systems the distributed dividends may have a further effect, reflecting behavioural changes due to the 'shareholder value orientation' (henceforth SVO) as suggested by Lazonick and O'Sullivan (2000) . In addition, as argued by Boyer (2000) among others, financial markets and institutions considerably raised the profitability targets imposed on management. As a consequence, the spectrum of the investments projects considered as sufficiently profitable to be implemented has been reduced. Hence, a considerable portion of the available cash flow has been made available for the accumulation of financial assets and/or dividend payments. For these reasons, equation (2) introduces this further effect of cash dividends payments as a ratio to K (CD/K):
In the light of the macroeconomic Post-Keynesian literature, we expect an adverse effect of CD/K on investments. We recognize that the rise in dividend payments can as also be the consequence of the process of financialization, and deceleration of accumulation, and therefore treat this variable as endogenous, as we discuss in more detail below in the section on estimation methodology.
Furthermore, not only do NFCs use part of their funds to pay interest and dividend to the financial sector, but they can also more than before pursue nonoperating financial investment themselves, thus receiving financial incomes.
Therefore, in equation (3) we include the sum of interests and dividends received by the NFCs (πF) as a ratio to K as an additional variable 6 :
Theoretically, the sign of the effect of financial incomes on investment is ambiguous. On the one hand, they may have a positive impact on the accumulation of fixed assets by easing the liquidity constraint faced by firms. In particular, this can be the case for smaller companies, which are more likely to experience liquidity restrictions compared to larger corporations. On the other hand, financial activities can also be detrimental to physical accumulation, since NFCs will be attracted by shortterm, reversible financial investment, instead of engaging in long-term, irreversible physical investment.
Finally, equation (4) Here we introduce a composite measure for outward financialization, F, which is the sum of interest and dividend payments (as a ratio to K), capturing a) the liquidity effect of interest payments, and b) the additional behavioural effect of the SVO. In brief, F reflects the financial outflows, while πF reflects the financial inflows.
Furthermore, in order to test the different effect of financial payments in small vs. large companies, we estimate an extended version of Model (4) as, With equations (4) and (4a) we aim at introducing a full model of firm-level investment that is coherent with the Post-Keynesian tradition of investment analysis, and that a) takes into account the inherent irreversibility of physical investment, b) controls for the independent effect of profitability and demand, c) highlights the effects of financial relations, d) makes a clear distinction between operating and nonoperating activities, and e) treats financial outflows and inflows, i.e. both outward and inward financialization, as fundamental determinants. 7
Data and stylized facts
We extracted our data from the Worldscope database of publicly listed firm's balance sheets, which contains standardized accounting information about not only investment, sales, profits, interest and dividend payments but also companies' financial incomes. Standardized data on financial payments and, in particular, financial incomes are difficult to find; our database allows us to have a comprehensive variable for our estimations. Worldscope database has been acknowledged as a valuable source in the literature on firm-level investment analysis (e.g. Cleary 1999; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; Love, 2003; Love and Zicchino, 2006) .
We use data for all active and inactive, publicly listed NFCs in the UK (thus excluding financial firms identified by the primary SIC codes from 6000 to 6799). 8 Our data are annual for the period of 1985-2013. 9 We found a high correlation between our variables and the corresponding macroeconomic data. 10 Tables 3A and 4A in the Appendix provide summary statistics for the total economy and manufacturing sector.
It is well-known that the presence of outliers usually characterizes firm-level data. To prevent biased estimations, we apply a data screening process, by excluding extreme outlier observations from the sample. First, we select firms that have at least three consecutive observations for the dependent variable, which is also required for econometric purposes (Roodman, 2009 ). Second, we drop all the companies with a permanent negative mean operating income. Finally, we exclude observations in the upper and lower 1% of each variable's distribution. 11 Next we present the stylized facts of our sample. As can be seen in Figure 2 , the rate of accumulation of fixed assets in the UK's NFCs decreased substantially during the early 1990s, and has only partially recovered, albeit not back to its peak level, with further declines during the Great Recession. Recession interest paid on debt diminishes, whereas dividends paid maintain their increasing trend after a brief period of fall.
[Figure 6]
In conclusion, the stylized facts show a) a stagnant rate of accumulation b) a declining rate of reinvestment of operating income c) an increase in the overall degree of financialization in terms of financial assets, incomes as well as payments.
Estimation methodology
Equations 1-4 presented in Section 3 are estimated using a dynamic panel-data model including two lags of the accumulation rate as explanatory variables. As explained in section 3, investment is an intrinsically dynamic phenomenon.
In dynamic panel data models, the unobserved panel-level effects are correlated with the lagged dependent variables. As a consequence, standard estimators (e.g.
Ordinary or Generalized Least Squares) would be inconsistent. Therefore, we estimate our models using a difference-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) . This methodology is suitable for analyses based on a 'small time/large observations' sample. 14 GMM is a powerful estimator for analyses based on firm-level data mainly for three reasons (Roodman, 2009) . First, GMM is one of the best techniques to control for all sources of endogeneity between the dependent and explanatory variables, by using internal instruments, namely the lagged levels of the explanatory variables, which allows us to address dual causality, if rising financial payments and incomes is also a consequence of the slowdown in the capital accumulation. The instrument set consists of instruments that are not correlated with the first difference of the error term, but correlated with the variable we are estimating. Second, by first-differencing variables, this estimator eliminates companies' unobservable fixed effects. Third, GMM can address autocorrelation problems. We apply two tests to assess the appropriateness of the instrument sets, and lag structures. First, we check for second-order serial correlation with the Arellano-Bond test (Arellano and Bond, 1991) . Second, we verify the validity of the instruments sets through the Hansen test. 15 In all models, the lagged dependent variable enters the instrument set as endogenous while all other explanatory variables enter as predetermined regressors. Consistently, the instrument sets include the second and third lags of the lagged dependent variable, and the first and second lags of the other lagged explanatory variables. We test the joint significance of the time dummies using a Wald test.
All the variables are in logarithmic form to allow for non-linear relationships between the dependent and the explanatory variables. Furthermore, the logarithmic scale enables us to reduce the disturbances coming from the presence of heteroskedasticity.
Our estimation procedure for each model is based on a 'general-to-specific' strategy, where we arrive at a model with only significant variables. Robust standard errors are calculated through a two-step procedure after a finite-sample correction (Windmeijer, 2005) .
Estimation results
This section presents our estimation results. Column 1 of Column 2 shows the results for Model (2). We find a significant negative impact of CD reflecting the SVO. Thus, the distribution of dividends not only decreases available liquidity but also has a further negative behavioural effect on accumulation. In column 5 we present an extended version of model 4 including the stock market evaluation (Tobin's Q) to test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of this widely used variable in the mainstream literature. 16 Tobin's Q has a statistical significant and positive effect, and the estimated signs and even magnitudes of the other coefficients remain robust.
[ Table 1 ]
Finally, Column 6 of Table 1 Table 2 presents the results. The signs of the coefficients of both financial incomes and payments are negative also for this period. Furthermore, the coefficient of financial incomes is more than double compared to that in the full period.
Second, we control also for another break in the UK economy, namely the early 1990s recession, and estimate our model for the period 1992-2007. The results reported in Column 2 in Table 2 are similar to the ones based on the estimation for the 1985-2007 period. The only main difference is a stronger negative effect of the financial payments.
[ Table 2 ]
Third, we estimated our final model using the raw-dataset to check the robustness to the inclusion of the outliers for the period of 1985-2013. As can be seen in Column 3 of Table 2 , the results are robust. 17 Fourth, we performed a robustness check by excluding the public services, transportation, and utilities sectors (primary SIC codes from 4011 to 4971 and 9111) with a high degree of governmental involvement, since these companies may behave differently. As can be seen in Column 4 of Table 2 , our estimation results are again robust.
Next we estimated Model (4) for the manufacturing sector only. Table 3 presents the results for different periods.
[ Table 3 ]
We focus on manufacturing companies for two reasons. First, our results are better comparable with other findings since a considerable part of the empirical analyses about firm-level investment is based on manufacturing. Second, as we have seen, the share of the manufacturing sector in the UK economy has decreased sharply ( Figure 1 ). It is worthwhile to test if financialization has led to a finance-led deindustrialization. The results in Column 1 in Table 3 are similar to the ones for the whole NFCs sample. Outward financialization, as well as financial incomes, had adverse effects on accumulation also in the manufacturing sector. As before, the magnitudes of these adverse impacts increase for both the pre-2007, and the intra-crises periods (Columns 2 and 3).
Finally, we present the economic significance of our estimates in Table 4 . 18 As argued by Ziliak and McCloskey (2008) , it is important to address the potential discrepancy between statistical and substantive significance of the estimated elasticities. We thus computed the 'economic significance' of our estimates in order to provide a more reliable measure about the magnitude of the effects. We compute the long-run elasticities by dividing each short-run elasticity by one minus the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. Multiplying the long-run coefficient by the actual cumulative change in each variable for the estimation period, we get the corresponding economic effect.
Sales (capacity utilization) have been the main determinant of accumulation while retained profits had a lower impact. Financial payments, i.e. outward financialization (the composite variable for interest payments and SVO) had a substantial negative impact on physical investment. The rate of accumulation would have been 8.5% higher without the rise in financial payments. Financial incomes, inward financialization, had an adverse effect as well, leading to a decline in the accumulation rate by 3.6%. The negative impact of outward financialization during the pre-crisis phase ) is substantially larger (-11.4%), due to a higher long-run coefficient.
[ Table 4 ] Unsurprisingly, the 2008 crisis has strongly reduced the financial incomes of NFCs. The cumulative increase in financial incomes before the financial crisis is much higher (1.233) than the increase in the full period (0.751). 19 Additionally, the long-run elasticity of financial income is stronger in this period (-0.109) . Hence, in the pre-crisis phase financial incomes have had a larger negative impact on accumulation. The accumulation rate would have been 13.5% higher without an increase in financial incomes.
Also in the manufacturing sector, the sharp rise in financial payments reduced the rate of accumulation by 13.5% from 1985 to 2013, and by almost 20% before the crisis. The 2008 financial crisis led to a decrease in the financial incomes of manufacturing, which in turn had a positive economic impact on the rate of accumulation in manufacturing companies by 10.2%. Given the higher elasticities, financial payments had the strongest negative economic effects in both time periods.
Conclusion
This paper presents empirical evidence on the effects of financialization on firm-level investment in the publicly listed NFCs in the UK based on a dynamic panel data model.
Our results show that financialization, depicted as the increasing orientation towards external financing, and the internal substitution of fixed accumulation by financial activity, had a fundamental role in suppressing investment in the NFCs in the UK. This is even more evident in the period before the financial crash, and especially for the manufacturing sector. The availabilty of internal funds constraints the investment decision. On the one hand, the increase in financial payments for external finance and to favor the shareholders (interest and dividends) reduce the NFCs internal funds, and thus accumulation. On the other hand, the negative crowding-out effects of financial investment on accumulation more than offset the gains from relaxing the cash-flow constraint. Financial incomes have a positive effect on investment only for the smaller companies.
In the UK NFCs, the rate of accumulation would have been higher without the rise in interest and dividend payments as well as financial incomes. The negative effects of financialization have been stronger in the pre-crisis period. The physical accumulation in manufacturing sector suffered even more experiencing a finance-led deindustrialisation. In particular, for the pre-crisis period in manufacturing we find that the adverse effects of financial payments and financial incomes almost entirely offset the positive impacts due to increasing sales and retained profits. It is important to stress that these results are based on the specific sample of publicly listed companies.
These results for the UK provide support to the theoretical arguments regarding the negative effects of financialization and confirm previous empirical findings at the macro and microeconomic levels for other countries. In particular, although not fully comparable, our results confirm previous findings at the microeconomic level for the USA (Orhangazi, 2008b) , as well as at the macroeconomic level for the USA and
European countries (see in particular Stockhammer, 2004 and van Treeck, 2008) .
The increasing interrelations between the financial markets and the NFCs are progressively reducing fixed capital accumulation, and thus growth. These results contrast with the mainstream arguments regarding the beneficial effects of financial deepening.
To reach a stable and vigorous dynamic of investment, a de-financialization of the non-financial sector is desirable. This requires an extended regulation of companies' non-operating financial activities along with financial regulation. The robust connection between past and present levels of accumulation increases the potential effectiveness of de-financialization economic policies.
Clearly our analysis does not exhaust the need for a deeper analysis about financialization of the NFCs, and further research is needed to assess the multifaceted feature of this phenomenon. In particular, the investigations of the determinants of companies' 'financial accumulation', as well as the sources of businesses' financial assets are important questions for future research. Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 Table 1A . Variables definition and codes. Van der Zwan (2014:114) "Corporate governance reform often came slightly later and partially as a response to financial market liberalization. The UK was an early mover, where shareholder-oriented corporate governance institutions were developed both through law and self-regulatory codes regarding the structure and duties of boards. Other countries followed with measures to strengthen shareholder rights and deregulate the use of corporate equity." 2 According to Lapavitsas and Powell (2013:375) , "the evidence indicated that, in all countries, nonfinancial corporations have become less reliant on banks and have increased their acquisition of financial assets.
However, there is variation in the trend, Japanese and German lagging behind US and UK enterprises." 3 In contrast, some authors of the Marxian tradition (e.g. Lapavitsas, 2009; Kliman and Williams, 2014) argue for a reversed causality, i.e. financialization of the economy should be understood as a consequence, and not as a cause of the slowdown in the capital accumulation. 4 The paper provides a response to the mainstream critiques of the use of liquidity measures to model investment by Jorgenson (1971) . 5 Variables definitions are in Appendix Table1A. In our version of the model by Fazzari and Mott (1986) we add the lagged rate of accumulation as an additional explanatory variable. Secondly, we do not need a variable for the gross plant value, since we already control for the companies' size by scaling each variable as a ratio to fixed capital. 6 Following the agreed accounting definition, 'non-operating income' is the portion of income that is derived from activities not related to firms' core operations. This type of income usually consists of dividend income, profits and losses from investments and currency exchange rate dynamics, plus other non-operating revenues.
As shown in Table 1A in the appendix, the two variables that constitute the aggregate financial profit are dividends and interests received by the company. This is also consistent with the way aggregate financial payments are defined. Interest and dividends do not exhaust the spectrum of non-operating financial incomes of NFCs. In fact Krippner (2005) shows how capital gains account for a considerable part of NFCs financial profits. However, as recognised by Orhangazi (2008b) with respect to Compustat database, also in Worldscope data on capital gains are not available.
